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irtually every theoretical model of exchange rates predicts that the real
exchange rate between two countries (with ﬂoating nominal exchange
rates) is correlated with the ratio of business-cycle conditions in the
two countries. Yet almost no empirical evidence exists to support this prediction
of the models. In fact, there is little empirical evidence that ties real exchange
rates to any underlying economic conditions. Some well-known studies have
concluded that exchange rates appear to have “a life of their own,” perhaps
moving with speculators’ expectations far more than with changes in economic
fundamentals. (See Flood and Rose [1995] for a prominent example.)
Contrary to this widely held contention, this article presents new evidence
that exchange rates are connected with fundamentals, in particular with the
relative gross domestic product (GDP) of each of the two countries involved,
as predicted by nearly all exchange-rate theories. Moreover, they are related in
the direction predicted by standard models: a country’s currency tends to be
depreciated in real terms when that country’s real GDP is relatively high, and
vice versa.
Why have previous studies not found this relationship between real ex-
change rates and ratios of real GDP? The answer is that the relationship is hard
to detect with simple linear models, because it appears to be nonlinear and
conditional on persistent movements (rather than purely transitory movements)
in the data. Recent theoretical and empirical work has pointed to the potential
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importance of nonlinearities in exchange-rate data and has pointed the way to
the evidence reported here.
1. WHAT THEORETICAL MODELS SAY
A common feature of nearly all models of exchange rates is the prediction that
the real exchange rate between two countries is correlated with the real-GDP ra-
tio between them.1 Deﬁne the real exchange rate as the exchange-rate-adjusted
ratio of price levels: if the nominal exchange rate e is the price of foreign money
(in units of home money) and if P and P¤ are the home and foreign price levels,
then the real exchange rate is q ´ eP¤/P. The real exchange rate measures the
relative price of a basket of foreign goods in terms of a basket of home goods.2
An increase in q means “real depreciation” of home currency (a decrease in
the relative price of home goods); a decrease in q means “real appreciation”
of home currency (an increase in the relative price of home goods). Deﬁne the
output ratio y as home real GDP divided by foreign real GDP. Most theoretical
models of exchange rates predict a positive relationship between y and q.
The economic reasoning behind this prediction is not difﬁcult, though its
details differ depending on the model. First, consider an equilibrium model
of exchange rates as outlined in Stockman (1987). The real exchange rate in
that model, as in other equilibrium models3 and some sticky-price models,4
equals the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) in consumption between home
and foreign goods. Consider a model with two countries and two goods, one
produced exclusively in each country. A representative consumer in the home
country has the utility function U(x,y), where x and y represent consumption of
home and foreign goods by consumers in the home country. A representative
consumer in the foreign country has the utility function U¤(x¤,y¤), where x¤ and
y¤ represent consumption of home and foreign goods by foreign consumers.
Regardless of many other details of a model like this, an equilibrium will
usually entail a condition that says
MRS(x,y) = MRS¤(x¤,y¤) = 1/q, (1)
where
MRS(x,y) = UX(x,y)/UY(x,y) (2a)
1 Some models, such as in Stockman and Tesar (1995), do not necessarily make this predic-
tion because they postulate demand shocks with ﬂexible prices.
2 The baskets of goods are the baskets used to measure the price indexes P and P¤.
3 See, for example, Stockman (1980, 1987), Lucas (1982), and Svensson (1985).
4 See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Kollmann (1997). The equilibrium
differs in other models, such as in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1998).           





are the equilibrium marginal rates of substitution between home and foreign
goods, X and Y, for the home and foreign consumers. The difference between
the operations of most models with ﬂexible or sticky prices lies in the behav-
ior of the consumptions, x and y, inside the MRS function. Short-run price
stickiness affects consumption, so it affects the real exchange rate q.
First consider a model with ﬂexible prices and suppose that production
of the home good, X, rises exogenously, holding ﬁxed the production of the
foreign good, Y. This rise in the supply of the home good typically reduces its
equilibrium relative price; i.e., it typically depreciates the home real exchange
rate (it raises q). Therefore a rise in the ratio of home-country output to foreign-
country output is associated with home-currency real depreciation.
A simple example occurs when the utility functions are the same in both
countries and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is
unity. Then a 10 percent increase in production of X reduces its relative price
by 10 percent in equilibrium, and consumers in each country increase their
consumption of X by 10 percent and leave their consumption of Y unchanged.5
With any standard utility function, an increase in x, holding y ﬁxed, reduces
MRS(x,y) and thereby causes home real depreciation (a rise in q).6 This discus-
sion has assumed that home output rises exogenously with no change in foreign
output. However, the same reasoning and results apply when home and foreign
5 This occurs regardless of the asset market structure of the model—the result holds with
complete asset markets or no asset markets at all. See Stockman (1987) and Cole and Obstfeld
(1991). More generally, whether the increase in supply of X raises or reduces home consumption
of the foreign good Y depends on details of the model. For example, if the elasticity of substitution
between the two goods is very low, then the demand for X may be very inelastic, and a 10 percent
increase in the supply of X may reduce its price so much that home consumers reduce consumption
of Y.
6 The implication in this example that home output rises relative to foreign output may
appear to depend on the use of different units of measurement for the two outputs—with home
output measured in units of the home good X and foreign output measured in units of the foreign
good Y. However, the model continues to predict a positive relationship between the output ratio
and the real exchange rate if both outputs are expressed in common units, as long as the elasticity
of substitution between the goods is less than unity (so that demands for the goods are elastic).
For example, suppose both are measured in units of the home good X. The value of foreign
output, measured in units of the home good X,i sqys, where ys denotes foreign output of good
Y. Letting xs denote home output of good X, the ratio of home-to-foreign output, expressed in
common units, is xs/qys. With unit-elastic demands, this ratio stays constant as xs and q move
together. When demands are less than unit-elastic, this ratio rises and falls together with xs and
q. So units of measurement of the output ratio become an important issue only if demands are
elastic. This article uses national GDP data with each country’s real GDP expressed in units of
its own production bundle to calculate the output ratio y, so this measurement issue does not
apply. However, the measurement issue would become important if a similar analysis calculated
the output ratio with an exchange-rate-adjusted ratio of nominal GDP series.      
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output move together (as in the data) with output in one country exogenously
rising more than output in the other country.7
Not surprisingly, the model’s implication for comovements of the output
ratio and the real exchange rate is reversed for exogenous changes in demand.
After all, changes in supply generate negative comovements of the output of
a good and its price; changes in demand generate positive comovements. For
various reasons, most models of exchange rates of the type discussed above
have relied on productivity shocks rather than demand shocks to drive the
model.8 This reliance results partly from the relative success of real business-
cycle models driven by technology shocks and partly from the difﬁcult task
of identifying demand shocks in the data. (Fiscal policy changes appear to be
much too small and infrequent in the data to explain either business cycles
or exchange-rate changes; taste shocks are inherently unobservable, though
potentially measurable through their effects on the economy.)
Despite the small role of demand shocks in ﬂexible-price models, they have
played the key role in another class of models—those with sluggish nominal
price adjustment. These models predict, even with demand shocks, that output
ratios and real exchange rates are positively correlated—a rise in home output
relative to foreign output (a rise in y) occurs together with real depreciation of
home currency (a rise in q). Again, the basic economic reasoning is straight-
forward and robust to many perturbations of details in the models.
When prices are sticky in the short run, a vast array of business-cycle
models generates the prediction that an increase in aggregate demand raises
real output in the short run. Corresponding models of open economies also
predict short-run home-currency depreciation (the nominal exchange rate, e,
rises), which translates into real depreciation (an increase in q) because of
sticky prices. Together, these two results imply that aggregate demand shocks
create a positive relationship between the output ratio y and real exchange
rate q.
Despite differences in detail across sticky-price models, the reasons for
their exchange-rate predictions share a common feature: in each model, the
exchange rate is determined through an uncovered-interest-parity condition.
7 This basic logic is not sufﬁcient to generate an unambiguous prediction for the balance of
trade or the current account of the balance of payments, as Stockman (1990) explains. To see
why, imagine ﬁrst that the increase in home production is temporary and that nothing that people
do can make it permanent. In that case, people in the home country will typically want to save
a large fraction of this temporary increase in income, and they will save by lending to (investing
in) people in foreign countries. This international lending creates a surplus in the balance of trade
and the current account. Now suppose instead that the increase in home production can be made
permanent (or at least longer lasting) through investment to expand the economy’s capital stock.
In this case, investment demand rises and the equilibrium increase in investment (in the short
run) may exceed the equilibrium increase in production; if so, the economy runs a deﬁcit in its
trade balance and current account.
8 See Stockman and Tesar (1995) for a counterexample.      
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Uncovered interest parity says that the expected rate of change of the nominal
exchange rate equals the difference in nominal interest rates across countries.
This condition derives from two components: (1) the arbitrage condition of
covered interest parity, which states that the forward exchange rate relative to
the spot exchange rate equals the difference in interest rates (and which is well
substantiated in the data), and (2) the hypothesis that the forward exchange rate
equals the expected future spot exchange rate. The second component, unlike
the ﬁrst, appears to be falsiﬁed in the data for reasons that economists do not
yet understand.9 Its falsiﬁcation does not necessarily invalidate theories that
use it as a component (any more than quantum effects invalidate Newtonian
physics) because the violations (which appear to be either time-varying risk
premia or systematic forecast errors) could be small enough that they do not
materially affect the theory.
The common reasoning in these models states that the increase in aggregate
demand (perhaps resulting from a monetary shock) depreciates the expected fu-
ture nominal exchange rate. Given the difference in nominal interest rates across
countries, uncovered interest parity then requires a corresponding depreciation
of the current nominal exchange rate. In some models, such as in Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1995), the shock to aggregate demand does not affect the interest
differential, so the current nominal exchange rate immediately depreciates to
its expected long-run level.10 In other models, such as in Dornbusch (1976) or
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1998), the shock to aggregate demand reduces
the home nominal interest rate relative to the foreign rate, requiring a short-
run depreciation in excess of the long-run depreciation. In both cases, nominal
depreciation implies real depreciation (a rise in q) in the short run because of
sticky prices.11 As a result, the models imply a positive correlation between
the output ratio y and real exchange rate q.12
9 With exchange rates expressed in logarithms, arbitrage would make this second compo-
nent true in a world without uncertainty. Froot and Thaler (1990) discuss the puzzle of empirical
falsiﬁcation of this component.
10 In the Obstfeld-Rogoff model, for example, the short-run response of the output ratio is
proportional to the short-run response of the nominal and real exchange rates, with the factor
of proportionality determined by the elasticity of substitution in consumption between various
goods.
11 Even a model in which the nominal interest rate rises in the short run (because the
expected-inﬂation effect of a monetary shock exceeds the fall in the real interest rate) would
predict currency depreciation if the increase in the home nominal interest rate were smaller than
the percentage increase in the long-run exchange rate.
12 For reasons similar to those explained in footnote 7, these models do not make unam-
biguous, robust predictions about the response of the trade balance or current account, or about
comovements between these and other variables.         
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2. EMPIRICAL METHODS AND RESULTS
Data for the models consist of quarterly observations on exchange rates and
real GDP for Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, generally over the
period 1974:1 through 1996:4. These countries appear in the sample as repre-
sentative of developed economies with some heterogeneity in geography and
circumstances, yet with consistent and reliable data. Germany is notable for
its absence in the sample. Its exclusion is due to data issues associated with
uniﬁcation, which could play a particularly important role with our short sample
of less than 25 years per country.
Deﬁne the nominal exchange rate eab as the domestic price in country a of
the (foreign) currency of country b, and qab as the (natural) logarithm of the







An increase in qab indicates “real depreciation” of currency a and “real ap-
preciation” of currency b. Deﬁne yab as the (natural) logarithm of the ratio of







where GDPa indicates real GDP in country a.
As noted above, standard models with sticky prices, such as in Dornbusch
(1976) and its variants, including Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Chari, Ke-
hoe, and McGrattan (1998), imply a positive relationship between qab and yab.
Speciﬁcally, a monetary expansion in country a raises yab (above its long-run
equilibrium value) and raises qab (that is, it causes real depreciation of currency
a).
Simple correlations are not consistent with this prediction. For example,
simple correlations between qab and yab appear in Table 1, with the United
States as the comparison country for each exchange rate. They are negative
in seven out of eight cases. Only the correlation for Switzerland takes the
predicted positive sign, and that correlation is smaller than the absolute values
of four of the seven negative correlations.
While most empirical economic research involves linear methods, recent
empirical and theoretical work motivates an alternative nonlinear approach to
the data. Recent empirical papers present evidence of nonlinearities in univari-
ate time-series models of exchange rates.13 These papers examine nonlinear
models of exchange rate adjustment toward purchasing-power-parity levels
13 See O’Connell (1997); O’Connell and Wei (1997); Michael, Nobay, and Peel (1997);
Obstfeld and Taylor (1997); and Taylor and Peel (1997).         
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when adjustment takes place only or mainly outside a band around the long-run
level of the exchange rate or when adjustment is simply more rapid because ex-
change rates begin farther from their long-run levels. Recent evidence strongly
indicates nonlinearities in exchange-rate behavior, with faster mean reversion in
exchange rates when they begin far from purchasing-power-parity levels. This
result means that the half-life of real exchange rates (the time it takes them to
return to their long-run levels following a one-time shock) is apparently lower
than previous research had indicated. Whether the half-life is small enough for
consistency with theoretical models remains unknown.14
Similarly, recent theoretical work suggests reasons for weaker adjustment
of exchange rates toward purchasing power parity when the economy is close
to its long-run equilibrium. Uppal and Sercu (1996) have explored a simple
model of international arbitrage costs in product markets that implies little or
no adjustment of real exchange rates toward long-run levels when the econ-
omy is close to long-run equilibrium. Proportional arbitrage costs create a
no-arbitrage band around a long-run equilibrium, in which the real exchange
rate can vary without tendency to return to a mean.15 Outside that band,
14 The theoretical models discussed above use the same shocks to generate business cycles
and changes in real exchange rates, so they predict not only correlations between the two but
similar half-lives of real exchange rates and output ratios. More research is required to test this
prediction of the models.
15 In a simple version of this model, countries are autarkic within the no-arbitrage band
and the real exchange rate is indeterminate within the limits of that band. Consider a simple
static model with a single homogeneous good randomly endowed and consumed in each of two
countries. Imagine that the countries are identical ex ante in every respect. Suppose there are
“iceberg” costs associated with shipping a good from one country to the other—when one unit
of a good is exported by either country, only k < 1 goods arrive in the other country. (This
situation resembles the commodity points discussed by Heckscher (1916) in analogy to the gold
points of the classical gold standard, or zones of inaction in models of irreversible investment,
or s-S inventory models.) Consider the equilibrium of such a model with complete markets in
which consumers trade in asset markets prior to knowing the levels of random endowments. The
equilibrium involves a no-arbitrage band—if endowments are sufﬁciently similar, then people
consume their endowments, while if endowments are sufﬁciently dissimilar, then people with high
endowments ship some of their goods to people with low endowments. Because of the “iceberg”
costs of shipping, consumers choose not to trade on asset markets and not to equate consumption       
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arbitrage opportunities lead the real exchange rate back toward the band. This
arbitrage-cost framework provides a loose interpretation of the recent empiri-
cal work mentioned above.16 Ohanian and Stockman (1997) have extended the
model developed by Uppal and his coauthors to a dynamic context.17 While
their model is directed at a different issue (explaining commonly suggested
connections between exchange rates and international portfolio adjustments),
it also implies that factors generating international portfolio adjustments inside
the no-arbitrage band could mask connections between real exchange rates and
other variables. As a result, connections between the real exchange rate and
other variables, such as the output ratio, may be stronger outside that band.
More generally, the signal-to-noise ratio may be larger when shocks are larger
and drive either the output ratio or real exchange rate farther from its long-run
equilibrium; we exploit this idea empirically below.
A key issue in analyzing exchange-rate data involves the choice of whether
and how to ﬁlter those data. The correlations in Table 1 would be meaningless
if either qab or yab were nonstationary. Unfortunately, standard statistical tests
are unable to distinguish between the two main alternative hypotheses about
these data: that they are trend-stationary or that they contain unit roots. This
inability to distinguish the form of the trend in these data is not unique to this
article—it plagues almost all analyses of real exchange-rate data and, indeed,
macroeconomic analysis more generally. The hypothesis of trend-stationarity in
qab means that the probability distribution of qab is stationary after a determin-
istic time trend has been removed from qab. The alternative hypothesis of a unit
root in qab means that qab has a random trend, in the sense that the probability
distribution of changes in qab is stationary. The same applies to trends in yab.
One can investigate these trends by testing for the presence of a unit root in a
standard unit-root test, such as the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The results of
unit-root tests for qab or yab are available from the author; however, they share
a common characteristic with many unit-root tests in macroeconomic data in
that they yield ambiguous results.
in the two countries. While a modiﬁed version of purchasing power parity holds outside the band,
within the band, nominal and real exchange rates are indeterminate. With sticky prices or real
costs of arbitrage outside the band, the real exchange rate can deviate from the band with only a
slow tendency to return in the long run. It is this idea that forms the basis for the recent empirical
studies of nonlinearities in exchange-rate behavior.
This simple model leaves many questions open. What are the arbitrage costs? How large are
they? Evidence indicates that they are connected not only with distance but national borders—see
Engel and Rogers (1996)—without providing reasons for this connection. These questions pose
challenges for future research.
16 The interpretation is loose for several reasons. One reason is that most recent empirical
work uses linearly detrended (real or nominal) exchange-rate data. While changes in equilibrium
relative prices may create such trends, the statistical models do not take into account the effects of
this trend on the rate at which arbitrage would push the exchange rate back toward the (moving)
band.
17 See Uppal (1993); Uppal, Sercu, and Van Hulle (1995); and Uppal and Sercu (1996).          
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Unit-root tests have many well-known problems. One serious problem is
that these tests have low power to reject unit roots (correctly, when the data
in fact do not have unit roots) in short samples like those available for the
current analysis, particularly when the true root is close to unity. For example,
the power to reject a unit root is low in a short sample when a series follows
a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process, yt = ®yt¡1 + ut, where ¡1 <®<1, but
the root ® is 0.95 or some other number close to 1. The power of these tests
to reject unit roots correctly is also low when the data follow a more compli-
cated (but stationary) time-series process, like the nonlinear processes studied
in the papers mentioned in footnote 13. For example, Taylor and Peel (1997)
show that nonlinear mean reversion can create a high probability of failing to
reject unit roots when using standard methods, even when the data are actually
stationary. For these reasons, this article follows most other research on real
exchange rates by treating real exchange rates q as trend-stationary. For similar
reasons, we also treat real-GDP ratios y as trend-stationary. This assumption
makes results in this article more easily comparable with the bulk of other
empirical work in the area.18
We begin with an examination of whether the detrended series, DTq and
DTy, is more strongly related when one of the series is large (in absolute value)
relative to its mean. Table 2 shows conditional correlations between detrended
GDP ratios (DTy) and detrended real exchange rates (DTq) when the absolute
value of the detrended real exchange rate is large. The ﬁrst column of statistics
shows unconditional correlations; the second column shows the correlations
that are conditional on the absolute value of DTq > 0.1 (which means that the
detrended real exchange rate is at least 10 percent above or below its mean). The
interpretation of this table requires an economic model. One might think about
an arbitrage model with a no-arbitrage band of unknown size and interpret the
table as capturing situations in which the exchange rate is outside that arbitrage
band. Alternatively, one might think that many factors other than business-cycle
conditions affect the relationship between exchange rates and output ratios in
normal times and that when the exchange rate is close to its mean, this “noise”
makes it difﬁcult to detect a consistent relationship. Under this interpretation,
larger deviations of exchange rates from their means may indicate times when
the “signal-to-noise” ratio is larger, allowing economists potentially to observe
the relationships predicted by the theories outlined earlier.
18 The usual assumption that the real exchange rate is trend-stationary, adopted here, implies
a failure of long-run absolute purchasing power parity (though not relative purchasing power
parity). The underlying assumption is that something—like differences in productivity growth
causing differences in the trend relative price of nontraded goods, which are part of the bundles
of goods included in the real exchange rate measure—cause the equilibrium real exchange rate
to show a trend. The data clearly support the presence of some trend, whether stochastic or (as
here) deterministic and linear.          
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Table 2 Correlations between Detrended Exchange Rates and








U.K., Japan 0.66 0.78 0.79 0.79
France, Japan ¡0.21 ¡0.31 ¡0.01 ¡0.02
Italy, Japan 0.15 0.14 0.24 0.34
Switzerland, Japan 0.08 0.17 0.20 NA
Australia, Japan 0.18 0.29 NA NA
Netherlands, Japan ¡0.32 ¡0.45 NA NA
Spain, Japan ¡0.03 0.05 0.25 NA
Canada, Japan 0.41 0.50 0.46 NA
U.K., U.S. ¡0.12 ¡0.27 ¡0.42 NA
France, U.S. ¡0.21 ¡0.69 NA NA
Italy, U.S. 0.01 0.01 ¡0.15 NA
Switzerland, U.S. 0.16 0.27 0.38 0.63
Australia, U.S. ¡0.23 ¡0.59 0.21 0.26
Netherlands, U.S. ¡0.47 ¡0.64 ¡0.63 NA
Spain, U.S. ¡0.50 ¡0.57 NA NA
Japan, U.S. 0.46 0.62 0.68 0.69
NA = Not available due to insufﬁcient number of observations.
Table 2 examines the connection between output ratios and real exchange
rates when the latter are far from their detrended means, measured as when the
absolute value of the detrended log real exchange rate—ABS(DTq)—exceeds
0.1, 0.15, or 0.2. The results show, at best, a very weak connection between
output ratios and exchange rates even when exchange rates are far from their
means. Half (eight of 16) of the unconditional simple correlations are positive;
only nine of 16 are positive when the absolute value of the detrended exchange
rate exceeds its mean by 10 percent or more.
Table 3 is analogous to Table 2 in that it shows conditional correlations
between detrended GDP ratios (DTy) and detrended real exchange rates (DTq).
While Table 2 conditions on a large real exchange rate, Table 3 conditions
on a large absolute value of the detrended output ratio. Again, one might use
the arbitrage model to interpret this table as capturing situations in which the
economy is outside the arbitrage band. Alternatively, one might think of large
output ratios as indicating times when the signal-to-noise ratio is large enough
that we could ﬁnd evidence of the comovements predicted by the theories
outlined above.
Like the results of Table 2, those in Table 3 fail to show any strong connec-
tion between output ratios and exchange rates even when output ratios are far
from their means. The ﬁrst column of statistics shows unconditional correlations
between real exchange rates and output ratios; the second column shows the       
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Table 3 Correlations between Detrended Exchange Rates and








U.K., Japan 0.63 0.67 0.73 0.78
France, Japan ¡0.19 ¡0.22 ¡0.32 ¡0.29
Italy, Japan 0.23 0.28 0.23 0.22
Switzerland, Japan 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.36
Australia, Japan 0.18 0.25 0.34 0.33
Netherlands, Japan ¡0.32 ¡0.34 ¡0.32 ¡0.38
Spain, Japan ¡0.03 ¡0.03 ¡0.06 ¡0.13
Canada, Japan 0.54 0.59 0.75 0.81
U.K., U.S. ¡0.12 ¡0.14 ¡0.20 ¡0.10
France, U.S. ¡0.21 ¡0.23 ¡0.22 ¡0.25
Italy, U.S. 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.25
Switzerland, U.S. 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.40
Australia, U.S. ¡0.23 ¡0.28 ¡0.27 ¡0.11
Netherlands, U.S. ¡0.47 ¡0.52 ¡0.53 ¡0.47
Spain, U.S. ¡0.50 ¡0.55 ¡0.57 ¡0.64
Japan, U.S. 0.46 0.63 0.66 0.66
correlations conditional on the absolute value of DTy > 0.01 (which means
that the detrended output ratio is at least 1 percent above or below its mean).
Other columns show the results for larger values of output ratios. Evidently,
the correlation is not much different when the real exchange rate is far from
its mean (as in the last three columns of Table 2) or when the output ratio is
far from its mean (as in the last three columns of Table 3) than when both are
close to their means.
Tables 2 and 3 address the issue of large versus small values of detrended
real exchange rates and output ratios but not issues of transitory versus more
persistent changes in these variables. Business cycles refer to changes in real
GDP that are sustained over at least several quarters. One might expect a
stronger relationship between exchange rates and real GDP over business cy-
cles and longer periods than over short periods, which may see many unrelated,
transitory changes in output ratios and exchange rates.
We now turn to the connection between real exchange rates and output
ratios when changes in either are sustained for several quarters. Table 4 shows
that the results change substantially when we condition in a different way
to capture business cycles. Although the table focuses on Japan as the base
country, similar results appear when the United States is the base country. Col-
umn 1 shows the percentage of positive observations of a country’s detrended
real exchange rate over the entire sample. The numbers are all close to one-
half. Column 2 shows the percentage of positive observations of a country’s       
84 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 4 Percentage of Positive Detrended Real Exchange Rates
When Detrended GDP Ratios are Positive
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U.K., Japan 52 82 87 91 89 10¡6
Canada, Japan 46 66 73 74 75 0.002
Switzerland, Japan 53 68 75 73 88 0.002
U.S., Japan 54 70 77 81 72 0.02
France, Japan 54 51 54 56 64 0.18
Netherlands, Japan 52 52 50 50 65 0.26
Italy, Japan 52 56 58 55 58 0.54
Spain, Japan 52 49 50 51 45 0.73
Australia, Japan 45 47 48 38 52 1
detrended real exchange rate conditional upon its detrended GDP ratio being
positive in the same quarter. In six of nine cases, the percentage of positive
observations of the detrended exchange rate is larger than in the entire sample
(column 1). Columns 3 through 5 show the same information conditional upon
detrended GDP ratios being positive for the next two, four, or six consecutive
quarters. The percentage of positive detrended exchange rates is generally larger
when we condition on positive GDP ratios. This result occurs in eight out of
nine cases in column 5, and in most cases the percentage is quite high. Column
6 shows the marginal probability level for rejecting the null hypothesis that
the numbers in column 5 arise purely by chance (such as when one draws
them randomly from a binomial distribution). This “sign test” (treating posi-
tive and negative observations as binomial draws) assumes that the underlying
distribution is symmetric, which appears to be roughly true in these data. (The
fact that the numbers in the ﬁrst column are close to one-half is consistent
with this assumption). In four of the nine cases (the United Kingdom, Canada,
Switzerland, and the United States), we can strongly reject the null hypothesis
that the connection between detrended real exchange rates and detrended GDP
ratios arises purely by chance. Even in the ﬁve cases in which we cannot reject
that null hypothesis, more than half of the observations are positive in four
of the ﬁve cases (France, the Netherlands, Italy, and Australia). For example,
column 5 shows that almost two-thirds of the observations are positive for both
France and the Netherlands.
One can achieve greater statistical power by pooling the data; however,
the probability distribution is exceedingly complicated when one allows for
dependence across country pairs. Overall, nearly two-thirds of the observations       
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Table 5 Percentage of Positive Detrended GDP Ratios
When Detrended Real Exchange Rates are Positive
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U.K., Japan 42 70 72 77 77 0.01
Canada, Japan 38 60 63 71 75 0.01
U.S., Japan 45 63 72 78 72 0.04
Australia, Japan 53 58 57 59 65 0.11
Switzerland, Japan 59 65 67 63 68 0.14
France, Japan 52 48 51 53 62 0.38
Spain, Japan 48 41 45 48 54 0.84
Netherlands, Japan 52 43 42 43 42 0.65
Italy, Japan 41 50 53 52 47 1
on the detrended real exchange rate in column 5 of Table 4 are negative (with
264 observations in that column, the detrended exchange rate is negative in
183 instances and positive in 81 instances). The probability that this occurs
purely by chance would be only three hundred-millionths of 1 percent if data
on detrended GDP ratios and exchange rates in each row of the table were
independent. Of course, the fact that Japan is involved in each comparison
means that the data are probably dependent. However, even with dependence
across observations, the results in this table show strong evidence that when
a country’s detrended GDP rises for six straight quarters relative to Japan, its
currency tends to take a low value on foreign exchange markets (q is high).
Table 5 shows analogous calculations that are conditional upon sustained
depreciation of real exchange rates. Column 1 of Table 5 shows the percentage
of positive observations of a country’s detrended output ratio over the entire
sample. Column 2 shows the percentage of positive observations of a country’s
detrended output ratio conditional upon its detrended real exchange rate being
positive in the same quarter. Except in the Netherlands (and Spain for durations
shorter than six quarters), exchange rates show real depreciation signiﬁcantly
more often when the GDP ratio is high for several quarters (than in the overall
sample). Unfortunately, the number of observations available for calculations in
column 6 is sufﬁciently low that we can strongly reject the null hypothesis that
this result arises purely by chance for only three of the nine cases in column
5—for the United Kingdom, Spain, and the United States.
Tables 4 and 5 examine groupings of observations in these data that are
conditional upon whether one of the variables exceeds its mean for some
duration. Table 6 extends this evidence by testing the null hypothesis that     
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Table 6 Test Results: Means of Detrended Exchange Rates Conditional


















1 and 2 are equal
U.K., Japan 0.08 ¡0.08 ¡11.0
Canada, Japan 0.07 ¡0.07 ¡9.0
U.S., Japan 0.05 ¡0.05 ¡6.4
Italy, Japan 0.01 ¡0.05 ¡4.3
Australia, U.S. 0.03 ¡0.02 ¡3.0
Switzerland, Japan 0.01 ¡0.00 ¡0.6
Spain, Japan 0.00 0.00 1.1
France, Japan ¡0.01 0.01 2.3
Netherlands, Japan ¡0.01 0.03 4.3
the mean detrended exchange rate does not depend on whether the detrended
GDP ratio is above or below its median value. The large absolute values of
the t-statistics in column 3 of Table 6 indicate rejection of that null hypothesis.
In seven of nine cases, we can reject the hypothesis that the means of the real
exchange rates do not depend on the GDP ratio. In ﬁve of those seven cases
the direction of the difference in means is the direction predicted by standard
models. The exceptions are France and the Netherlands. In most cases, the
evidence in this table, as in Tables 4 and 5, clearly indicates that high GDP
ratios and depreciated real exchange rates tend to occur together in the data.
Because the results of Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the connection between
real exchange rates and GDP ratios is strongest when one of the series shows
sustained movement away from its mean, Table 7 adds duration to the test
shown in Table 6. Speciﬁcally, it repeats the test in Table 6 with the condi-
tion that the detrended GDP ratio is above or below its median value for six
straight quarters. In every case we can reject the hypothesis that the means do
not depend on the GDP ratio; in six of the nine cases, the connection is in
the direction predicted by standard models. Spain now joins France and the
Netherlands as exceptions. Table 7 provides even stronger evidence that high
GDP ratios and depreciated real exchange rates tend to occur together.
Together, Tables 4 through 7 provide the strongest evidence currently avail-
able that changes in real exchange rates are connected to changes in real-GDP
ratios over periods of several quarters, as predicted by nearly all existing models
of exchange rates.       
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Table 7 Test Results: Means of Detrended Exchange Rates Conditional




















1 and 2 are equal
U.K., Japan 0.11 ¡0.13 ¡15.9
Canada, Japan 0.10 ¡0.10 ¡12.3
U.S., Japan 0.06 ¡0.05 ¡6.9
Italy, Japan 0.02 ¡0.11 ¡9.4
Australia, U.S. 0.04 ¡0.07 ¡6.8
Switzerland, Japan 0.06 ¡0.02 ¡8.3
Spain, Japan ¡0.03 0.02 2.9
France, Japan 0.01 0.03 2.3
Netherlands, Japan ¡0.01 0.04 5.1
3. CONCLUSIONS
The inability of economists to ﬁnd strong statistical relationships between ex-
change rates and underlying economic conditions has been a huge puzzle in
international economics. In particular, standard models of both the sticky-price
and ﬂexible-price varieties predict that real depreciations of a country’s cur-
rency tend to occur along with increases in its output relative to foreign output.
The ﬁndings reported here are probably the strongest evidence yet that this
relationship appears in the data. The same ﬁndings show that the relationship
is nonlinear and conditional. These empirical results raise a set of new questions
for future research, particularly regarding related nonlinear and conditional con-
nections between exchange rates and other variables. It appears that exchange
rates, after all, do not have lives of their own.
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